‘However, in referring to embodiment we must be cautious. The idea of privileging bodily presence in the static sense would be problematic if it were to reinforce the infamous mind and body dualism that has dogged the Western mindset for several centuries. This would be contrary to our intentions. Arguably, the word ‘body’ is more than a concrete noun, and when we speak of ‘embodying’ information we try to emphasize action and practice. We do so to acknowledge that the individual mind is not merely the internal workings of a small blob of matter known as the ‘brain’ but to suggest that it is – in scientific terms – part of the general continuum of space-time. We may understand the acquisition of knowledge or, more subjectively, ‘wisdom’, as an insight into what we are, in our ‘becoming’, as human beings. In this sense we could also think of individual embodiment as an aspect of our general predicament in the changing present.‘ (Wood, 1998: 1f)

JON ERIKSON

‘Presence has an inverse relationship to language. Presence seems to be most evident in silence, since it resists the disembodying proclivities of discourse. One is holding back the articulate meaning that the audience is expecting. Presence of the body is stronger when linguistic desublimation is absent; more precisely, not absent, but not yet manifested. … This all might seem to place the idea of presence at only an extreme level of embodiment, when in fact people who are effective speakers fully engaged in discourse can have presence as well. But even here, we acknowledge their presence only when we cease to simply acknowledge the meaning of their words, or at least become aware of their body’s relationship to their words. We acknowledge the physical property of the voice, we acknowledge the timing of their words – which draws attention to the physical action of the voice, and again the relation of expectation to silence. So in fact the words almost become supplements to the meaning displayed by the body’s physical attitude. At times, presence is made even more acute when the body displays an attitude contradictory to the words. At that point we always believe the truth of the body over the truth of the words ….’ (Erickson, 1998: 63)

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