‘(T)he existence of the subject in the theater is dependent on the participation of some component in the action, (…) so that even a lifeless object may be perceived as the performing subject, and a live human being may be perceived as an element completely without will.’ (Veltruský, 1964: 84)

The actor's specific presence:

‘All that is on the stage is a sign. “But the theatrical costume and the house on the set, or the gestures of the actors, do not consist of as many constituent signs as a real house or real clothing. On the stage, a costume or a part of the set are limited to one, two or three signs. (…)" The actor’s body, on the other hand, enters into the dramatic situation with all of its properties. A living human being can understandably not take off some of them and keep on only those he needs for the given situation. This is why not all the components of the actor’s performance are purposive; some of them are simply given by physiological necessity (…). The spectator of course understands even these nonpurposive components of the actor’s performance as signs. This is what makes the figure of the actor more complex and richer, we are tempted to say more concrete, as compared to the other sign carriers. It has in addition to its sign character also the character of reality. And the latter is precisely that force which forces all the meanings to be centered upon the actor.’ (ibid.: 84f)

The object-actor: human props:

‘Such human parts of the set are for instance soldiers flanking the entrance to a house. Their reality is (…) depressed to the “zero level”, since their constituent signs are limited to the minimum. (…) Thus people as part of the set form the transition between the sphere of man and the sphere of the object. (...) As can be seen, the sphere of the live human being and that of the lifeless object are interpenetrated, and no exact limit can be drawn between them.’ (ibid.: 86, original emphasis)

The actor-object: props and action:

‘The prop is not always passive. It has a force (…) that attracts a certain action to it. As soon as a certain prop appears on the stage, this force which it has provokes in us the expectation of a certain action. It is closely linked to this action that its use for another purpose is perceived as a scenic metonymy. This link is shown even clearer in the case of the so-called imaginary props. (…) The actor performs without props an action for which a certain prop is usually required, the spectators feels its presence although in reality it is not presence. (…) The link between prop and action is demonstrated in an opposite way when no subject is present in the play, that is when no actor is on stage. Even then, the action does not stop. (…) Without any intervention of the actor, the props shape the action. They are no longer the tools of the actor, we perceive them as spontaneous subjects equivalent to the figure of the actor. For this process to occur, one condition must be met: the prop must not be the mere outline of an object to which it is linked by a factual relationship, because only if it preserves its reality can it radiate its action force and suggests action to the spectator.’ (ibid.: 88, original emphasis).

‘It is therefore impossible to draw a line between subject and object, since each component is potentially either. We have seen various examples of how thing and man can change places, how a man can become a thing and a thing a living being. We can thus not speak of two mutually delimited spheres; the relation of man to object in the theater can be characterized as a dialectic antinomy.’ (ibid.: 90, original emphasis).

STELARC

‘It is not longer meaningful to see the body as a site for the psyche or the socioal, but rather as a structure to be monitored and modified; the body not as a subject but as an object – NOT AS AN OBJECT OF DESIRE BUT AS AN OBJECT FOR DESIGNING. (…) As an object, the body can be amplified and accelerated, attaining planetary escape velocity. It becomes a post-evolutionary projectile, departing and diversifying in form and function.’ (Stelarc in Bell and Kennedy, 2001: 562, original emphasis)

References